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Between the Species
Carnivorous Companions and the
Vegetarian’s Dilemma

ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with a problem that arises within ethical
frameworks that imply that it is wrong for humans to consume meat
or other animal products when vegan alternatives are available. The
specific problem relates to the ethical difficulties associated with beginning a relationship with a companion animal that may require
at least some animal-based foods in order to survive. I follow some
psychologists in referring to the ethical problems associated with
such companionship as the Vegetarian’s Dilemma. After approaching this dilemma from the perspective the animal rights approach
and welfarist consequentialism, I argue that some important insights
can be gained by viewing this dilemma through a virtue ethical lens.
In particular, I point out the ethical significance of the fact that the
very same virtues that might lead one to adopt a vegan lifestyle may
also support adoption of a carnivorous companion.
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In my own experience, a surprising number of ethical vegans
or vegetarians have carnivorous animal companions. In fact, it
is not uncommon to hear people report that their first shifts
towards veganism were initially inspired by their personal relationship with a nonhuman such as a dog or a cat. Some animal
rights theorists, such as Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka,
report similar experiences: “for some people the route to [ethical veganism] is an intellectual process, but for many others, it
comes (if at all) through relationships with individual animals”
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 23-24).
In this paper, I am concerned with a common perceived inconsistency (or, as some may put it, a hypocrisy) in a large
subsection of the ethical vegan and vegetarian community.
The charge of hypocrisy comes from the observation that in
order to maintain a companionship relationship with carnivorous companions, one must acquire animal-based foods for the
companions in question. This means that many ethical vegetarians and vegans find themselves endorsing the following two
commitments, which, when combined, seem to generate a kind
of inconsistency: 1) It is wrong to kill animals for food, and
2) It is permissible to continue to participate in the killing of
animals for food in order to support a nonhuman companion.
The tension between these two statements has been referred to
as the Vegetarian’s Dilemma (Rothberger 2014).
In order to fully explore this dilemma, I will begin with two
assumptions: First, I will assume (without argument) that there
are good reasons to believe that some form of ethical veganism
(the view that it is prima facie wrong for humans in developed
countries to consume animal products, wear animal products,
or otherwise support industries that rely on animal products)
is correct. I take this for granted because it is only under this
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assumption that the problems associated with carnivorous
companionship can be raised. In other words, the problem I
am concerned with only arises within ethical frameworks that
imply some version of the claim that it is generally wrong to
consume animal products.
Second, I will assume that the health of at least some common carnivorous companions is contingent upon access to animal-derived foods that, practically speaking, must be acquired
by farming and slaughtering sentient animals. It should be
noted that I am not here attempting to establish this empirical
claim. It may well be that this assumption will be proven false,
as I have heard many anecdotal accounts of cats (for example)
that live healthy lives on a vegan or mostly-vegan diet. Nonetheless, it is worth considering what, ethically speaking, would
follow from its truth, as its truth is not out of the question. I
have personally heard many anecdotal reports from veterinarians and others who claim that there are serious risks for vegan
cats. Additionally, there are several frequently cited studies
that raise concerns about the nutritional adequacy of commercially available vegan cat foods (Gray, Sellon, and Freeman
2005; Kanakubo, Fascetti, and Larsen 2015).1 Finally, social
scientists who have researched vegetarians with carnivorous
companions have found that the belief that a vegan diet can be
harmful to cats is very widespread, even among strict ethical
vegans (Rothberger 2014). Because this belief is widespread
and has some empirical support, it is philosophically interesting to inquire into what would follow from its truth.
Once again, I am not here attempting to fully defend either
of these assumptions, as doing so would take me well beyond
1 See Gray et al. 2005 and Kanakubo et al. 2015 for a discussion of the problems with vegan cat food alternatives.
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the scope of this paper. Rather, I am granting them in order to
investigate what would follow from their truth.
The first point that must be observed about the Vegetarian’s
Dilemma is that the two most common defenses of ethical veganism (welfarist consequentialism and the animal rights approach) seem to categorically deny that it is justifiable to kill
farmed animals in order to feed a companion animal.
For example, the well-known proponent of animal rights
Tom Regan explicitly says that “when we must choose between
overriding the rights of many who are innocent or the rights
of few who are innocent…then we ought to choose to override
the rights of the few in preference to overriding the rights of
the many” (Regan 1983, 305). This ‘miniride’ principle clearly
implies that we should override the rights of a single cat rather
than the many animals that must be killed to sustain it over the
course of its life.
When addressing this very issue, Donaldson and Kymlicka
ask the following: “…what if it turns out some cats simply cannot be adequately nourished without animal protein in their
diet? How could we fulfill our duty to feed our cats without
violating the rights of other animals not to be killed?” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 150). As is obvious from this quotation, they believe that the animal rights position implies that
killing animals, and thus violating their rights, in order to feed
a carnivorous companion is not an ethically acceptable option.
While they stop short of explicitly recommending the abolition of carnivorous companions, they close this discussion with
the following ominous questions: “Does this level of restriction
undermine the possibility of cats being flourishing members
of mixed society? Does it mean that we would be justified in
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bringing about their extinction?” (Donaldson and Kymlicka
2011, 152). They do not explicitly answer these questions, but
the mere fact that they are stated in this format suggests that,
on an animal rights perspective, abolition of carnivorous companionship may be morally required.
Consider also welfarist consequentialism. This is the family of views that establish an obligation to refrain from animal
products because of the moral significance of the suffering,
happiness, or preferences of nonhuman animals (McPherson
2014, Norcross 2004, Singer 1995). According to most forms of
welfarist consequentialism, causing suffering or acting against
the preferences of nonhuman animals is wrong unless there are
strong reasons that override their preferences or suffering. On
such a consequentialist framework, the life of one animal (the
carnivorous companion) is clearly outweighed by the lives of
the numerous animals that would have to be killed in order to
sustain it.
Does this mean that all defenders of ethical veganism must
categorically reject carnivorous companionship? In what follows, I will show that a virtue-based approach to this question
yields very different results. While the existence of this third
position does not undermine the ethical insights of the rightsbased or welfarist positions, it does point to some plausible
considerations that are ignored by the other two perspectives
mentioned above. I now turn to an introduction of some of the
most prominent virtue-based accounts of animal ethics.

Virtue Approaches to Animal Ethics
Rosalind Hursthouse argues that our deliberations about animal ethics ought to focus on the following question: which of
our practices regarding animals express virtuous dispositions,
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and which express vicious dispositions? This approach is most
clearly explained in the following application of it to the suffering that occurs as a result of animal agriculture:
Can I, in all honesty, deny the ongoing existence of
this suffering? No, I can’t. I know perfectly well that
although there have been some improvements in the
regulation of factory farming, what is going on is
still terrible. Can I think it is anything but callous to
shrug this off and say it doesn’t matter? No, I can’t.
Can I deny that the practices are cruel? No, I can’t.
Then what am I doing being party to them? It won’t
do for me to say that I am not actually engaging in the
cruelty myself. There is a large gap between not being
cruel and being truly compassionate, and the virtue of
compassion is what I am supposed to be acquiring and
exercising. (Hursthouse 2006, 142)
The most important feature of Hursthouse’s framework is
that it answers ethical questions about a particular practice by
asking what virtues or vices are likely to be expressed by an
individual who engages in said practice. By doing so, we can
determine whether or not the practice in question is one that
“the virtuous, as such, go in for (or ideally, would go in for)”
(Hurthouse 2006, 141). For the duration of this paper, I will
use the construction “X expresses the virtue Y” as a way of
communicating that the individual who has the virtue Y would
likely choose the action X.
Other philosophers have recognized that a virtue ethical approach to animal ethics can often help us answer difficult ethical questions. Garrett Merriam, for example, uses this method
as a means of more carefully walking the “moral tightrope”
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associated with the ethics of using animals in biomedical experimentation (Merriam 2012, 126). He prefers a virtue ethical
approach in this context because it, “more so than any other
ethical theory, is capable of recognizing the moral vagueness
and ambiguity raised by this issue” (ibid). In a spirit similar to
Merriam’s, I will apply the insights of virtue ethics to the case
of carnivorous companionship in the hopes of teasing out some
ethical nuances that are ignored by other perspectives.
The first step towards using a virtue ethical framework to
approach the issue of carnivorous companionship is to determine which virtues and vices are most relevant. What dispositions of character are likely to be expressed by someone who
chooses to, or chooses not to, keep a carnivorous companion,
and which of those should play a substantial role in our ethical
theorizing about carnivorous companionship?
Despite the fact that some spheres of human behavior and
interaction (such as those associated with the virtues of tactfulness, discretion, and humor), do not have analogues in most relationships between humans and animals, a number of spheres
of human experience, as well as their associated virtues and
vices, do.
The first set of relevant virtues are strongly suggested by
Hursthouse’s comments (quoted above): sympathy and compassion. These are behavioral dispositions that any truly virtuous person would express to an appropriate degree in their
interactions with both humans and animals. Similarly, it seems
unproblematic to claim that the vices associated with these
spheres of human behavior (such as callousness or indifference) would never be expressed in the actions of the virtuous
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individual, irrespective of whether their actions are directed at
a human or a nonhuman animal.
This first category of virtues and vices (sympathy/compassion as well as callousness/indifference) are likely to be the
most important when considering questions regarding carnivorous companionship. This is because we can plausibly understand the choice to maintain a carnivorous companion as being
both in line with these virtues (as it involves concern and care
for another being), but also as problematically callous (as it may
also involve a lack of compassion for the animals upon which
the carnivorous companion will feed). Since these behavioral
dispositions play such an important role in the context of virtue
ethical defences of veganism, they will play a similarly central
role in the following analysis.
A second virtue that may be relevant is that of being just. I
follow Martha Nussbaum in understanding the sphere of human experience pertaining to the “distribution of limited resources” as relating to the virtue of justice (Nussbaum 1988,
37). Since the assumptions I laid out in earlier sections of this
paper characterize carnivorous companionship as necessarily
involving meeting the needs of one individual (the carnivorous
companion) by imposing a burden on another (by killing it and
transforming its body into food for the companion), decisions
about carnivorous companionship inherently involve making
judgments about the benefits and burdens that may result from
the distribution of resources. In other words, there are many
ways that actions related to carnivorous companions can express the character traits of justice or injustice.
Third, it is worth mentioning that courage and cowardice are also relevant to a virtue ethical account of carnivo-
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rous companionship. There are a number of ways that someone
could exhibit the vice of cowardice when trying to decide how
to deal with a carnivorous animal. Simply allowing someone
else to deal with the animal without exhibiting appropriate
concern for the future well-being of the carnivore involves an
unwillingness to take on responsibility and a reticence to face
a potentially difficult ethical decision. Alternatively, taking on
this responsibility for oneself may involve facing uncomfortable ethical questions, negotiating a number of dilemmas, and
engaging in a number of practices which may have questionable ethical implications. As Donaldson and Kymlicka put it,
…any individual contemplating having a companion
cat is signing on for a great deal of responsibility in
terms of doing the work to ensure their cat flourishes
under the necessary restrictions (e.g., efforts to find
palatable and nutritionally appropriate foods for them,
and to create opportunities for them to enjoy the outdoors while not endangering others)” (Donaldson and
Kymlicka 2011, 153).
In short, there are a number of ways that choices made with
respect to a carnivorous companion can exhibit the virtue of
courage or the vice of cowardice.
While many other virtues, vices, and character traits might
be relevant to the question of carnivorous companions, these
three can provide enough of a framework for us to start to understand and assess the alternatives that are open to an individual who is considering adopting such a companion.
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The Case of the Lycanthropic Human
Now that we have the philosophical resources of a virtuebased approach to animal ethics at our disposal, we can begin
to determine which virtues and vices would be expressed by
an individual who chooses to enter into the kind of relationship
that is typical of carnivorous companionship.
I begin by introducing a fictional case that makes the structure of carnivorous companionship relationships clear, but that
makes reference only to the members of a single species. In this
example, the caregiver, the companion, and the animals used
for food will all be human. My reason for using this example
rather than the more realistic example of adopting a cat stems
from my concern that it may be easy to draw on biased intuitions against the moral status of nonhuman animals in order to
justify carnivorous companionship. My example is designed to
neutralize those biased intuitions. The challenge to carnivorous
companionship involves pointing out that such companionship
requires killing a number of beings with full moral status in
order to sustain another being with equal moral status, and this
feature is best exemplified by considering a case that is structurally similar to carnivorous companionship, but involves individuals who are uncontroversially of the same moral status.
Without further introduction, the case I wish to discuss is
as follows:
A human has contracted a disease (lycanthropy) which
makes him irrational, incapable of speech, violent,
unpredictable, and easily distracted. He also seems to
have an insatiable desire for the taste of human flesh.
Furthermore, after running several tests, you have
decisive scientific evidence that his continued health
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depends on his regular consumption of human flesh
(other animal flesh does not contain all the compounds
necessary to maintain the lycanthropes’ health). If the
authorities learned of his existence and you did not
intervene, he would be imprisoned and subsequently
either euthanized or allowed to slowly die of malnutrition. The unpredictable violence of this human suggests that if you simply released him, he would regularly feed on weaker humans and, due to his seeming
willingness to entertain himself with violence, would
likely kill far more humans than is necessary to sustain him. Despite these features, the lycanthropic human is capable of developing close relationships with
some humans and experiences the full range of human
desires, pleasures, and emotions. He is, to some extent,
capable of understanding his predicament and demonstrates awareness of, and concern about, his future.
The following four choices arguably exhaust the plausible
options that are available to someone who has encountered this
lycanthropic human:
Option 1: Painlessly kill the lycanthrope or turn it over
to someone who will do so.
Option 2: Release the lycanthropic human to fend for
itself.
Option 3: Adopt the human and care for it by occasionally selecting, abducting, and killing humans in order
to feed it (or retaining a reliable, humane assassin to do
so for you).
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Option 4: Find someone else (either another human or
an organization) who will care for the lycanthrope and
feed it human flesh.
It is worth mentioning that there is a fifth option that I have
chosen to exclude: feeding the lycanthrope human flesh that is
harvested from humans that have died from natural causes or
accidents. I ignore it because it would not be a viable option
for someone considering the adoption of a cat or other carnivore. Even if it were possible to coordinate large-scale efforts
to discover, gather, and process the corpses of animals that
died naturally into ethically-sourced cat food, such an institution does not currently exist in our society and likely will not
exist any time soon. Since there is good reason to think that the
Vegetarian’s Dilemma cannot be resolved by this fifth option,
I will ignore it and focus on the four options that seem to be
analogous to the options that are practically available to anyone
considering the adoption of a cat. I now turn to a discussion of
what welfarism, the animal rights approach, and virtue ethics
would say about these four options in the case of the lycanthropic human.
Welfarist theories would choose the option that minimizes suffering and limits the number of people who need to be
killed. Option 1, which involves painlessly killing the lycanthrope, would likely best fulfill those criteria.
It is more difficult to see how a rights-based approach might
confront this dilemma. While some rights-based theories that
are inspired by Kantian philosophy or the distinction between
Doing and Allowing (such as Quinn 1989) might recommend
option 2, it seems to me that most versions of the animal rights
positions, such as those articulated by Donaldson and Kym-
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licka, would likely conclude that option 1 is the correct choice.
This consequence is implied by the selections from Donaldson
and Kymlicka’s work that were quoted earlier. Furthermore,
some aspects of Regan’s view also suggest that he would select
Option 1. As was mentioned above, Regan endorses the claim
that when we are in a situation where someone’s rights must be
violated, we must choose the action that will violate the rights
of the fewest (Regan 1983, 305). It is plausible to think that all
four of the options involve violating someone’s rights. Option 1
involves violating the lycanthrope’s right to life or, if it is simply restrained until it dies of malnutrition, its right to liberty.
Option 2 also plausibly involves violating the rights of many
people, specifically the many extra people that would be killed
by the loose lycanthrope for entertainment (this would especially be true if we accept that you violate someone’s rights if
you expose them to preventable harm). The remaining options
all involve the violation of some other humans’ negative rights
to not be harmed or, at the very least, their positive rights to be
protected from harm. Since options 2-4 plausibly involve violating the rights of many people while Option 1 only requires
the rights of a single individual to be violated, Regan would
likely recommend this course of action, in agreement with welfarism. That being said, some other authors have argued that
Regan has the resources to consistently recommend option 3
in some limited circumstances (Abbate 2016), but this consequence only follows if we make some significant modifications
to Regan’s view. In sum, it seems plausible to claim that most
versions of the animal rights theories would settle on Options
1 or 2.
The main contribution of this paper is the observation that a
virtue ethical perspective significantly disagrees with the options that are recommend by welfarism and rights-based theo-
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ries. It is true that Option 1 may be said to express some important virtues. For example, a truly just individual might choose
this option because it prevents anyone from being unjustly
forced to take on a burden in order to benefit some third party.
But a virtue ethical analysis reveals that an individual who
chooses Option 1 also suffers from some very important deficiencies in sympathy and compassion. A compassionate moral
agent should not merely look at the suffering of an individual
in need and coldly conclude that it must be killed. We may even
go as far as to say that the individual who simply turns the lycanthrope over to be killed is problematically callous.
Option 2 is even less defensible from a virtue ethical perspective. This choice likely leads to the greatest number of humans being killed, and these individuals will be killed indiscriminately (as the lycanthrope will likely kill many humans
for entertainment as well as food and will not have the capacity
to carefully select his victims). This choice therefore expresses
a complete lack of concern for justice, as well as a lack of compassion for the large number of victims that could be spared by
any of the other remaining options. Additionally, an individual
choosing to prioritize her own clean hands over the welfare of
others is not demonstrating courage, but rather is expressing
a form of cowardice. In short, Option 2 fares the worst from a
virtue ethical perspective.
There are, of course, many ethical concerns that could be
raised about the people who choose options 3 or 4. For example, we might plausibly point out that allowing humans to be
killed (or killing them oneself) to maintain the life of the lycanthropic human reveals not only a lack of sympathy towards
the food-humans, but also a callousness towards human life
that must be considered vicious. However, I am not convinced
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that choosing options 3 or 4 necessarily reveals a lack of sympathy or an objectionable amount of callousness. This is largely
because the lycanthrope does not merely desire human flesh,
but requires it in order to survive. Once we acknowledge this
fact, the following question becomes absolutely crucial to this
discussion: if a morally-considerable being requires the death
of another morally-considerable being in order to survive, does
the first necessarily express callousness when taking the life of
the second? Rosalind Hursthouse answers this question in the
following way:
What if I needed meat to survive? That would, of
course, be a very different situation. No one would
think of many Africans, situated as they are, as being
short of compassion solely on the grounds that they ate
whatever the aid agencies provided. (Hursthouse 2006,
142).
If we agree with Hursthouse that one does not necessarily
express a lack of compassion simply by taking what one needs
(even the life of another) in order to survive, why wouldn’t the
same be true of someone who takes the life of another to allow
a third human to survive?
This point can be expressed more precisely by considering the following chain of inference. First, we must observe
that the ethics of eating animal products is heavily influenced
by our actual biological, ecological, and agricultural realities.
Many proponents of ethical veganism would accept that it is
only because it is possible for humans to thrive on a vegan diet
that we have any obligation to abstain from animal products.
If our biological, ecological, or agricultural realities were such
that a vegan diet and lifestyle was not practically possible, it
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is plausible to claim that we could eat meat or other animal
products without exhibiting callousness or a lack of sympathy.
To claim any alternative is to say that any human who does not
starve to death or suffer serious malnourishment for the sake
of others is callous or unsympathetic. It is not uncommon for
people discussing animal ethics to consider this issue by asking
what one would do if one were abandoned on an island with
insufficient sources of plant protein but plenty of wild pigs. It
does not seem that the people who kill pigs in this situation are
necessarily being callous or unsympathetic to those animals.
This intuition is acknowledged by other prominent proponents
of veganism, such as Mylan Engel (Engel 2000, 873).
The second step in this chain of inference is to ask what, if
anything, would change if a third party were to engage in the
acts of killing on behalf of another person who needed animal
products in order to survive and thrive. To modify the ‘desert
island’ example mentioned above, imagine two people stranded on an island with few sources of plant protein but many
pigs. One of the individuals was injured in whatever horrible
accident led to their being stranded on this particular island.
The injured party is also deathly allergic to the one significant source of plant protein that grows on the island (a legume
similar to the peanut). The other individual can consume the
legumes, and thus has no need of animal protein, but nonetheless catches and kills pigs for the injured person to consume
(but does not consume pig flesh herself). Does this third party
exhibit a lack of compassion or an objectionable amount of callousness towards the pigs that are killed to sustain her compatriot? It is hard to see how the motivations and dispositions of
this individual should be any different from the person who
consumes animal products in order to prevent her own starvation. If we have already agreed that imminent starvation or
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severe malnutrition make it possible to kill an animal for food
without exhibiting a lack of compassion, then it should not be
relevant whose starvation or malnutrition is imminent.
Finally, we have to apply these conclusions to the case of the
lycanthropic human where it is not pigs being killed to sustain
a human life, but rather other humans. Does this fact about the
case imply that the individual who cares for and feeds the lycanthropic human necessarily exhibits an objectionable degree
of callousness, or betrays a problematic lack of sympathy and
compassion? I suspect that anyone who believes that humans
deserve a higher moral status than animals (such as Cohen 1986
or Warren 1986) would answer this question in the affirmative,
but those who accept some version of the claim that animals
should be extended moral equality with humans ought to make
roughly consistent judgments about the individual who kills a
pig so another may live and the individual who kills a human
so another may live. At the very least, proponents of animal
equality should concede that both individuals are very likely to
express the same virtues and vices. In sum, if it is possible to
kill a pig to prevent the starvation of another without exhibiting
callousness, then it should also be possible to kill a human for
the same motives without exhibiting callousness.
I think this chain of reasoning serves as a plausible defense
of the claim that someone could choose options 3 or 4 without
necessarily exhibiting callousness. Additionally, unlike options 1 or 2, 3 and 4 both involve the expression of a profound
sympathy for a living being. When faced with this lycanthropic
human in need, an individual who chooses 3 or 4 decides to do
everything possible to find a home for it and provide for its biological needs. This kind of sympathy and compassion, which
is a virtue that plays a large role in virtue ethical accounts of
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animal ethics, is not exhibited by the actions described in either
Options 1 or 2.
Furthermore, Option 3 expresses more virtues than Option
4, as it would take considerable courage to take on the task
of providing for another creature when doing so will involve
participating in actions that are ethically suspect. By taking on
this responsibility oneself, rather than passing it off on someone who may not take it as seriously, our protagonist demonstrates not only courage, but also the willingness to take on difficult responsibilities and an unwillingness to risk that another
caregiver will care for the lycanthrope in a less ethical way
(by, for example, feeding it human meat that was not procured
humanely). Thus, it seems that a virtuous individual would be
very likely to ‘go in for’ Option 3 over any of the alternatives.
Ultimately, what should the virtue ethicist say about these
four options? None of them are perfect, as choosing any of the
available options involves the expression of at least some vices.
However, we have found that a person who chooses Option 3
not only expresses a deep, important form of compassion and
sympathy for the lycanthropic human, but also expresses a substantial degree of courage by choosing an option that requires
taking responsibility and making difficult decisions. After all,
it will prove very challenging for a truly compassionate person
to care for the lycanthropic human. In order to express a sufficient amount of compassion for the humans that will be used
as food, the chooser of Option 3 is essentially taking on the
obligation to experiment with a number food alternatives and
thus to try to find a diet that will sustain the lycanthrope with
the minimal loss of human life. This may involve paying for
regular health care for the lycanthrope, purchasing a variety
of expensive alternative foods and supplements, and closely
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monitoring the health and well-being of the cannibalistic companion. If it is truly determined that this being cannot survive
and flourish without food derived from humans, then the person who chooses Option 3 must work hard to acquire the foodhumans in the most humane way possible. None of these tasks
will be easy, and accepting a responsibility to perform them
expresses a considerable amount of courage.
Even though the person selecting Option 3 may be deficient
in a sense of justice, it seems very plausible to claim that we can
understand why a compassionate, sensitive, caring, and courageous person would decide to begin a companionship relationship with the lycanthropic human. This finding has profound
implications for the problem of carnivorous companionship.

From Lycanthropes to Cats
The fictional scenario I just considered at length is closely
analogous to adoption of a feline that needs a home. If it is
made known to someone that a cat does not have a home nor a
human companion to care for it, the four options below exhaust
the practically available options:
Option 1: Kill the cat (either directly or by restraining
it until it dies of malnutrition).
Option 2: Release the cat and leave it to its own devices
(which will certainly involve the death of many birds,
reptiles, and rodents).
Option 3: Adopt the cat and work to acquire the most
humanely harvested animal products for it.
Option 4: Turn it over to a humane society, a foster
home, or another individual who will care for it.
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Note, once again, that I am ignoring the fifth option of feeding the cat food derived from the corpses of naturally-dying
animals, as it is not likely that the current number of cats in the
world who need a home could, practically speaking, be sustained on this source of food.
Just like in the case of the lycanthropic human, we can see
that a compassionate, sensitive person would not consider Options 1 or 2. We can also see how someone may express a considerable amount of courage by choosing 3, which involves
taking on the responsibility to work as hard to possible to care
for the cat, monitor its health, and seek the most humane animal products possible (rather than standard factory-farmed cat
food), including as much vegan cat food as is practically possible, for it to consume. While such a person would arguably
express some kind of a deficiency in terms of the virtue of justice, Option 3 seems to express more virtues and fewer vices
than any of the other available options.
The important conclusion to focus on at this point is that
a virtue ethical approach would give a very different solution
to the Vegetarian’s Dilemma than would welfarist and animal
rights approaches. Whereas these other approaches deny that it
would be ethically acceptable to begin a companionship relationship with a carnivore, the virtue ethical approach shows us
that the very same virtuous dispositions that might lead someone to transition towards a vegan lifestyle (specifically sympathy and compassion) could also lead them to commit to caring
for a carnivorous animal in need. Thus, from a virtue ethical
perspective, veganism and carnivorous companionship are not
merely consistent, but are complementary in an important type
of way.
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Proponents of welfarism or the animal rights perspective
will likely dismiss these considerations on the grounds that a
focus on compassion and other virtuous dispositions may mislead us or otherwise prevent us from making correct ethical
judgments. However, my purpose in this paper is not to refute
welfarism or rights-based approaches any more than it is to offer a sustained defense of virtue-based approaches. Rather, my
goal has been to shed light on the fact that an often-neglected
perspective on animal ethics seems to provide a plausible and
unique account of how the Vegetarian’s Dilemma could be resolved.
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